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Wh-phrases in English can appear both raised and in-situ. However, only in-situ
wh-phrases can take semantic scope beyond the immediately enclosing clause. I
present a denotational semantics of interrogatives that naturally accounts for these
two properties. It neither invokes movement or economy, nor posits lexical ambi-
guity between raised and in-situ occurrences of the same wh-phrase. My analysis is
based on the concept of continuations. It uses a novel type system for higher-order
continuations to handle wide-scope wh-phrases while remaining strictly composi-
tional. This treatment sheds light on the combinatorics of interrogatives as well as
other kinds of so-called ¯A-movement.
1. Introduction
Baker (1968) discusses multiple-wh questions such as those in (1).
(1) a. Who remembers where we bought what?
b. Who do you think remembers what we bought for whom?
Each question in (1) contains three wh-phrases and is ambiguous between two read-
ings with different notions of what constitutes an appropriate answer.
(2) Who remembers where we bought what?
a. Alice remembers where we bought the vase.
b. Alice remembers where we bought what.
(3) Who do you think remembers what we bought for whom?
a. I think Alice remembers what we bought for Bob.
b. I think Alice remembers what we bought for whom.
Intuitively, both cases of ambiguity are because the final wh-phrase—what in (1a)
and whom in (1b)—can take either wide scope (2a, 3a) or narrow scope (2b, 3b).1
In this paper, I focus on two properties of interrogatives.
• Wh-phrases appear both raised and in-situ. For example, in (1b), who
and what appear raised while whom appears in-situ.
• Raised wh-phrases must take semantic scope exactly over the clause
they are raised to overtly. For example, in (1b), who must take wide
scope, and what must take narrow scope. Only whom has ambiguous
scope; accordingly, the question has only 2 readings, not 4 or 8.2
I present a strictly compositional semantics of interrogatives in English that ac-
counts for these properties. Specifically, in my analysis,
• there is no covert movement or wh-raising between surface syntax and
denotational semantics (contra Epstein’s (1992) economy account), yet
a single denotation suffices for both raised and in-situ appearances of
each wh-phrase. Moreover,
• as a natural consequence of the denotation of wh-phrases and the rules
of the grammar, only in-situ wh-phrases can take scope ambiguously.
I describe my system below as one where, roughly speaking, interrogative clauses
denote functions from answers to propositions (an old idea). However, such deno-
tations are not crucial for my purposes—the essential ideas in my analysis carry
over easily to a system where interrogative clauses denote say sets of propositions
instead. Hence this paper bears not so much on what interrogatives denote, but how.
My analysis builds upon Barker’s (2000a, 2000b) use of continuations to
characterize quantification in natural language. In Section 2, I introduce contin-
uation semantics as a two-step generalization of Montague’s (1974) treatment of
quantification. The system I present generalizes Barker’s semantics in several as-
pects, which I point out below as we encounter. In Section 3, I specify denota-
tions for interrogative elements and account for the properties above. In doing so, I
am not concerned with the semantics of verbs such as know that take interrogative
complements, but rather with how to derive denotations for interrogative clauses
themselves. Finally, in Section 4, I conclude with some speculations on further
applications of my treatment, for example to explain superiority effects.
This paper loosely follows the framework of Combinatory Categorial Gram-
mar (Steedman, 1987, 1996). However, I expect the central insights to be easy to
adapt to other frameworks of compositional semantics.
2. From PTQ to Continuations in Two Steps
Continuations are a well-known and widely applied idea in computer science. Many
analogies have been drawn to explain the concept; for example, in programming
language semantics, it is often said that “the continuation represents an entire (de-
fault) future for the computation” (Kelsey, Clinger, Rees et al., 1998).
From the perspective of natural language semantics, a continuation can be
thought of as “a semantic value with a hole”. To illustrate, consider the sentence
(4) Alice loves Bob.
In Montague grammar, the meaning of (4) is computed compositionally from de-
notations assigned to Alice, loves, and Bob. Starting with the values
(5) alice : e, love : e → e → t, bob : e,
where e is the base type of individuals and t is the base type of propositions, we
recursively combine semantic values by function application (Figure 1) to obtain
f (x) : β
f : α→ β x : α
Figure 1. Function application3
love(bob)(alice) : t
alice : e love(bob) : e → t
love : e → e → t bob : e
Figure 2. Alice loves Bob
the top-level denotation love(bob)(alice), of type t (Figure 2).3 Borrowing computer
science terminology, I say that the evaluation context of the constituent Bob in the
sentence (4) is the “sentence with a hole”
(6) Alice loves .
Semantically, this evaluation context is essentially a map
(7) c = λx. love(x)(alice)
from individuals to propositions—in particular, the map c sends the individual bob
to the proposition love(bob)(alice). The map c is called the continuation of Bob
in (4). I assign it the type
(8) e ⇀ t,
where ⇀ is a binary type constructor.
The value type of a continuation is its domain, and the answer type of a
continuation is its codomain. For example, the continuation c has value type e and
answer type t.4 I distinguish between the continuation type e ⇀ t and the function
type e → t, even though they may be interpreted the same way model-theoretically
(standardly, as sets of functions). In fact, I use the same notation to construct and
apply functions (namely λ and parentheses) as for continuations. The purpose of
distinguishing between continuations and functions is to maintain mental hygiene
and rule out undesirable semantic combination (see Section 3.2 below).
With the continuation c in (7) in hand, we can apply it to bob to recover the
proposition that Alice loves Bob, or apply it to carol to generate the proposition
that Alice loves Carol. We can play “what-if” with the hole in (6), plugging in
different individuals to see what proposition the top-level answer would come out
to be. In particular, we can compute
(9) ∀x. c(x)
to generate the proposition that Alice loves every individual. This intuition is why
Montague’s (1974) “Proper Treatment of Quantification” (PTQ) assigns essentially
the denotation
(10) JeveryoneK = λc.∀x. c(x) : (e ⇀ t) → t
to the quantificational NP everyone.5
Note that the type in (10) is (e⇀t)→t rather than the more familiar (e→t)→t.
This type documents our intuition that the denotation of everyone is a function that
maps each proposition with an e-hole (type e ⇀ t) to a proposition with no hole
(type t). In general, a semantic value whose type is of the form α ⇀ γ can be
thought of as “an γ with a α-hole”, in other words a continuation that—given a
hole-filler of type α—promises to produce an answer of type γ. To redeem this
promise is to feed the continuation to a function of type (α⇀ γ) → γ′ in return for
a final answer of type γ′. (In the case of everyone in (10), the two answer types γ
and γ′ are both t, and the value type α is e.)
As one might expect from this discussion, types of the form (α ⇀ γ) → γ′
recur throughout this paper. I write α[γ′γ
]
as shorthand for such a type. For example,
the denotation of everyone given in (10) can be alternatively written
(11) JeveryoneK = λc.∀x. c(x) : e[tt
]
.
I call α the value type, γ the incoming answer type, and γ′ the outgoing answer
type.
Continuation semantics can be understood as a generalization of PTQ, in
two steps:
• Lift not just the semantic type of NPs from e to e[tt], but also the se-
mantic type of other phrases from say α to α[tt
]
.
• Lift each type α to not just the type α[tt], but any type of the form α[γ′γ ],
where γ and γ′ are types.
I detail these steps below.
2.1. First Generalization: From e[tt
]
to α
[t
t
]
In PTQ, the semantic type of NPs is not e but e[tt
]
. For example, the NPs Alice and
Bob denote not the individuals alice : e and bob : e, but rather the lifted values
JAliceK = λc. c(alice) : e[tt
]
,(12a)
JBobK = λc. c(bob) : e[tt
]
.(12b)
In general, any value x : e can be lifted to the value λc. c(x) : e[tt
]
. The lifted type e[tt
]
is borne by all NPs, from proper names like Alice and Bob to quantificational NPs
such as everyone and someone.
JeveryoneK = λc.∀x. c(x) : e[tt
]
,(13a)
JsomeoneK = λc.∃x. c(x) : e[tt
]
.(13b)
λc. c(x) : α[tt
]
x : α
Figure 3. Lifting semantic values
Jlove BobK = λc. c(love(bob)) : (e → t)[tt
]
?
JloveK = λc. c(love) : (e → e → t)[tt
]
JBobK = λc. c(bob) : e[tt
]
Figure 4. The desired output of a lifted semantic rule
Although proper names and quantificational NPs share the same lifted type, the
denotations of the latter do not result from lifting any value.
PTQ is appealing in part because it assigns the same lifted type to all NPs,
quantificational or not. We can generalize this uniformity beyond NPs. For exam-
ple, let us lift intransitive verbs from the type e→ t to (e→ t)[tt
]
, and transitive verbs
from the type e → e → t to (e → e → t)[tt
]
.
JsmokeK = λc. c(smoke) : (e → t)[tt
]
,(14a)
JloveK = λc. c(love) : (e → e → t)[tt
]
.(14b)
In general, any semantic value x, say of type α, can be lifted to the value λc. c(x),
of type α[tt
]
. This lifting rule is shown in Figure 3.
To maintain the uniformity of types across the grammar, we want every VP
to take the same semantic type (e → t)[tt
]
. Furthermore, just as the new denotation
of smoke in (14a) is its old denotation smoke lifted, the new denotation of love Bob
should also be its old denotation, love(bob), lifted. What we now need is a semantic
rule that will combine a lifted function with a lifted argument to form a lifted result.
For example, the rule should combine JloveK = λc. c(love) with JBobK = λc. c(bob)
to form λc. c(love(bob)), the denotation we desire for love Bob. This situation is
depicted in Figure 4.
Consider now the following calculation.
λc. c(love(bob)) = λc. (λc′. c′(love))(λ f . c( f (bob)))
= λc. JloveK(λ f . c( f (bob)))
= λc. JloveK(λ f . (λc′. c′(bob))(λx. c( f (x))))
= λc. JloveK(λ f . JBobK(λx. c( f (x)))).
(15)
In the first two lines, the atom love is replaced with a variable f , which gets its value
from the lifted denotation of love. In the last two lines, the atom bob is similarly
replaced with x, which gets its value from the lifted denotation of Bob. The end
result is a way to write down the lifted result of a function application in terms of the
lifted function and the lifted argument, without mentioning any unlifted atoms. This
λc. ¯f (λ f . x¯(λx. c( f (x)))) : β[tt
]
¯f : (α→ β)[tt] x¯ : α
[t
t
]
Figure 5. Lifted function application (evaluating function then argument)
λc. x¯
(
λx. ¯f (λ f . c( f (x)))) : β[tt
]
¯f : (α→ β)[tt] x¯ : α
[t
t
]
Figure 6. Lifted function application (evaluating argument then function)
technique generalizes to a new semantic rule, lifted function application, shown in
Figure 5. It satisfies the requirement in Figure 4, as is easily checked.
As it turns out, there is another way to satisfy the requirement. The calcula-
tion in (15) above replaces the atom love first and the atom bob second. If instead
we replace bob first and love second, we arrive at a different result.
λc. c(love(bob)) = λc. (λc′. c′(bob))(λx. c(love(x)))
= λc. JBobK(λx. c(love(x)))
= λc. JBobK(λx. (λc′. c′(love))(λ f . c( f (x))))
= λc. JBobK(λx. JloveK(λ f . c( f (x)))).
(16)
This alternative calculation in turn gives rise to a different lifted function application
rule, that in Figure 6.
The two rules in Figures 5 and 6 differ in evaluation order. Roughly speak-
ing, the evaluation order of a programming language is the order in which “com-
putational side effects” like input and output occur as expressions are evaluated (in
other words as code is executed). Continuations are often used in programming lan-
guage semantics to model evaluation order, for instance in Plotkin’s (1975) seminal
work. Adopting this terminology, I say that our first rule evaluates the function be-
fore the argument, and our second rule evaluates the argument before the function.
2.2. Quantification
With the semantic rules and lexical denotations introduced so far, we can derive
the sentence Alice loves everyone. Figure 7 shows one analysis, essentially that of
Barker’s (2000a).
I indicate semantic rules used in derivations with the following notation.
• A unary branch decorated with ∧ invokes the lifting rule (Figure 3).
• A binary branch decorated with > invokes the one of the two lifted
function application rules that evaluates the left daughter first, in other
words either the function-then-argument rule (Figure 5) or the mirror
image of the argument-then-function rule (Figure 6).
• A binary branch decorated with < invokes the other of the two lifted
function application rules, which evaluates the right daughter first.
λc.∀x. c(love(x)(alice)) : t[tt
]
>
λc. c(alice) : e[tt
]
∧
alice : e
λc.∀x. c(love(x)) : (e → t)[tt
]
>
λc. c(love) : (e → e → t)[tt
]
∧
love : e → e → t
λc.∀x. c(x) : e[tt
]
Figure 7. Alice loves everyone
x¯(λx. x) : t
∨
x¯ : t
[t
t
]
Figure 8. Lowering lifted propositions
In this derivation, all evaluation orders give the same result, so both binary branches
in Figure 7 could have been decorated with < instead of >. Evaluation order does
not matter for this sentence because it only contains one quantificational NP. For
other sentences, such as someone loves everyone, different orders of evaluation give
differently scoped results (Barker, 2000a).
2.3. Lowering
The top-level denotation derived in Figure 7 has type t[tt
]
, in other words (t⇀ t)→ t.
This type is not t, the type that clauses usually receive in Montague grammar. This
discrepancy is expected, since every type α, say α = t, has been lifted to the type
α
[t
t
]
= t
[t
t
]
. We can recover the usual, type-t denotation of the sentence by applying
the lifted denotation—as a function—to the identity continuation. That is, compute
(17) (λc.∀x. c(love(x)(alice)))(λx. x) = ∀x. love(x)(alice) : t
to recover the propositional meaning of Alice loves everyone. Here the identity
continuation λx. x : t⇀t corresponds to the trivial evaluation context “ ”: a sentence
with a sentence hole, and nothing else.
In general, from any value x¯ whose type is t[tt
]
we can recover the proposi-
tional value x¯(λx. x), of type t. This gives us the lowering rule in Figure 8. Where
this rule is used in derivations below, I decorate the unary branch with ∨.
2.4. Second Generalization: From α[tt
]
to α
[
γ′
γ
]
The type t plays a special role in PTQ: It is the only answer type. Because PTQ
is after all a treatment of quantification, it is natural there for the answer type to
be fixed at t by lexical denotations like those of everyone and someone in (13).
However, in the treatment of extraction and interrogation that I present below, not
λc. c(x) : α[γγ]
∧
x : α
Figure 9. Lifting semantic values, revised
λc. ¯f (λ f . x¯(λx. c( f (x)))) : β[γ0γ2
]
>
¯f : (α→ β)[γ0γ1
]
x¯ : α
[γ1
γ2
]
Figure 10. Lifted function application (evaluating function then argument), revised
λc. x¯
(
λx. ¯f (λ f . c( f (x)))) : β[γ0γ2
]
<
¯f : (α→ β)[γ1γ2
]
x¯ : α
[γ0
γ1
]
Figure 11. Lifted function application (evaluating argument then function), revised
x¯(λx. x) : γ
∨
x¯ : α
[
γ
α
]
Figure 12. Lowering lifted values, revised
all clauses have the same type. Gapped and interrogative clauses do not denote
propositions; they have types other than t. So our semantic rules must deal with
lifted values whose answer types are not t.
The semantic rules introduced so far (Figures 3, 5, 6, and 8) do not mention
any logical operator. Thus the type t plays no essential role in these rules, and
can be replaced with a type variable γ. Start with the lifting rule (Figure 3): Any
semantic value x, say of type α, can be lifted to the value λc. c(x), of (polymorphic)
type α
[γ
γ
]
. This revised lifting rule is shown in Figure 9.
The other semantic rules can be similarly revised, by substituting γ for t
throughout. However, further generalization is possible. We can not only support
answer types other than t, but also allow multiple answer types to occur in the
same derivation. In technical terms, consider the λ-terms in our semantic rules:
How polymorphic can their types be without risking a mismatch? The most general
types that can be assigned are shown in Figures 10–12. (Note that the two versions
of lifted function application now differ in their types.)
Let me summarize the semantics we have arrived at. Alongside of func-
tion application, we have added to Montague grammar four semantic rules: lift-
ing, two versions of lifted function application, and lowering. These four rules,
shown in Figures 9–12, suffice below to analyze extraction and interrogation, ex-
cept wh-phrases taking wide scope call for higher-order continuations (Section 3.4).
λx. buy(x)(we) : e ⇀ t
∨
λc. λx. c(buy(x)(we)) : t[e⇀tt
]
>
λc. c(we) : e[e⇀te⇀t
]
∧
we : e
λc. λx. c(buy(x)) : (e → t)[e⇀tt
]
>
λc. c(buy) : (e → e → t)[e⇀te⇀t
]
∧
buy : e → e → t
λc. c : (e ⇀ t) → (e ⇀ t)
Figure 13. We bought
3. Manipulating Answer Types
In this section, I present my analysis of interrogatives using continuations. I first an-
alyze extraction and raised wh-phrases, then turn to in-situ wh-phrases and multiple-
wh interrogatives.
3.1. Extraction
In order to analyze interrogatives with raised wh-phrases, I first need a theory of
extraction. Fortunately, continuation semantics provides for a natural and composi-
tional analysis of extraction. One possible implementation is to posit a phonologi-
cally null NP, notated “ ”, whose denotation is6
(18) J K = λc. c : (e ⇀ γ) → (e ⇀γ),
that is, the identity function over individual-taking continuations.7 Figure 13 shows
how to derive we bought . The final denotation has type e ⇀ t, a continuation
type. This is typical of a clause with an unsaturated gap, and is intuitive consid-
ering that continuations are supposed to model evaluation contexts, in other words
expressions with holes.
Figure 13 reflects one important difference between the continuation seman-
tics here and Barker’s system. Barker takes the answer type to be t everywhere; he
does not generalize PTQ to arbitrary answer types (as I do in Section 2.4 above).
My present purposes require that we not fix a single answer type, for two reasons.
First, not all clauses have the same type. Although basic declarative sentences such
as Alice loves Bob have type t, I want sentences with gaps and interrogatives to have
other semantic types. Second, my semantics not only calls for a mixture of different
answer types, but in fact contains denotations that modify what can be thought of
as the “current answer type”.
Manipulation of answer types is exemplified by the denotation of in (18)
and the derivation of we bought in Figure 13. Examining the denotation of ,
we see that it takes as input an e-taking continuation whose answer type is γ, but
returns a final answer of type e ⇀ γ instead. Informally speaking, J K acts like
an e locally, but in addition prepends “e ⇀” to the current answer type; hence we
bought receives the semantic type e ⇀ t rather than t. In general, a value of type
(19) (α⇀ γ) → γ′
acts like the value type α locally, but in addition transforms the incoming answer
type γ to the outgoing answer type γ′. The denotation J K is a special case where
α = e and γ′ = e⇀γ. Another special case is denotations lifted using the lifting rule,
for which γ = γ′ and manipulation of answer types degenerates into propagation.8
The intuition that values like J K “change the current answer type” is re-
flected my shorthand notation for continuation types, introduced above in Section 2.
The type of J K can be written alternatively as e[e⇀γγ
]
, so as to emphasize that it acts
locally like an e, but prepends “e ⇀” to the answer type. Note also, in Figures 10
and 11, how lifted function application concatenates two changes to the answer
type—first from γ2 to γ1, and then from γ1 to γ0—into a change from γ2 to γ0.
3.2. Raised Wh-phrases
As alluded to in Section 1, my interrogative denotations are roughly functions map-
ping answers to propositions. To make this idea precise, I introduce yet another
binary type constructor{, so as to form question types such as e{ t. As before,
I distinguish between the question type e{ t, the continuation type e ⇀ t, and the
function type e→ t, even though they may have the same models and I overload the
same notation to construct and apply all three kinds of abstractions.
I now analyze the sentences
(20) a. Alice remembers what [we bought ].
b. What did we buy ?
I ignore the subject-auxiliary inversion triggered by direct (top-level) interrogatives.
In Section 3.1 is derived a denotation of type e⇀ t for the embedded clause
we bought . Let us assume, as is commonly done, that remembrance relates persons
(type e) and questions (type e{ t for now). Then remember has type (e{ t)→e→ t.
Having assigned meanings to every other word in (20a), I need to specify
what what means. Note that we bought is of type e⇀ t, but remember requires the
distinct type e{ t for its input. Therefore, the denotation of what should convert
we bought from e⇀ t to e{ t. I make the simplest assumption to that effect—that
what has the semantic type (e⇀t)→(e{t). The semantic content of what should be
essentially the identity function, but express the requirement that the input to e{ t
be somehow inanimate. I am not concerned with the nature of this requirement
here, so I simply notate it as a bracketed formula [¬animate(x)], as in
JwhatK = λc. λx. [¬animate(x)] c(x) : (e ⇀ t) → (e{ t),(21a)
JwhoK = λc. λx. [animate(x)] c(x) : (e ⇀ t) → (e{ t).(21b)
remember
(
λx. [¬animate(x)] buy(x)(we))(alice) : t
alice : e e → t
remember : (e{ t) → e → t e{ t
JwhatK : (e ⇀ t) → (e{ t) λx. buy(x)(we) : e ⇀ t
we bought
(Figure 13)
Figure 14. Alice remembers what [we bought ]
The formula [¬animate(x)] c(x) can be thought of as “if ¬animate(x) then c(x), oth-
erwise undefined”.
The definitions in (21) makes no concrete use of the base type t. Indeed, we
can generalize them to
JwhatK = λc. λx. [¬animate(x)] c(x) : (e ⇀γ) → (e{ γ),(22a)
JwhoK = λc. λx. [animate(x)] c(x) : (e ⇀γ) → (e{ γ).(22b)
I use this generalization to analyze multiple-wh clauses in Section 3.3 below. Re-
gardless, we can derive (20a). One derivation is shown in Figure 14. Once the
meaning of we bought is derived, the rest of the derivation consists entirely of
(unlifted) function application.
Why distinguish between function types (→), continuation types (⇀), and
question types ({)? The distinction prevents the grammar from overgenerating
sentences like *I remember Alice bought or *I remember what what Alice bought.
The types enforce a one-to-one correspondence between gaps and wh-phrases—
more precisely, interrogatives gaps and raised wh-phrases.
3.3. In-situ Wh-phrases
The analyses above of extraction and raised wh-phrases are both natural in the spirit
of continuation semantics. The primary payoff from these analyses is that little more
needs to be said to treat interrogatives with in-situ wh-phrases and to account for
the two properties I listed in Section 1.
The first property is that wh-phrases appear both raised and in-situ. For
instance, the clauses in (23) contain what raised and whom in-situ.
(23) a. What did we buy for whom?
b. what we bought for whom
λx. [¬animate(x)] λy. [animate(y)] for(y)(buy(x))(we) : e{ e{ t
JwhatK : (e ⇀ e{ t)
→ (e{ e{ t)
λx. λy. [animate(y)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we) : e ⇀ e{ t
∨
λc. λx. λy. [animate(y)]
c(for(y)(buy(x))(we)) : t[e⇀e{tt
]
>
e
[
e⇀e{t
e⇀e{t
]
∧
we : e
(e → t)[e⇀e{tt
]
>
λc. λx. c(buy(x)) : (e → t)[e⇀e{te{t
]
>
(e → e → t)[e⇀e{te⇀e{t
]
∧
buy : e → e → t
λc. c
: e
[
e⇀e{t
e{t
]
((e → t) → (e → t))[e{tt
]
>
(
e → (e → t)
→ (e → t))[e{te{t
]
∧
for : e → (e → t) → (e → t)
JwhoK : e[e{tt
]
Figure 15. What we bought for whom, with the narrow-scope reading for whom
Ignoring the subject-auxiliary inversion in (23a), these two clauses are identical. To
derive them, all we need is an uncontroversial meaning for for:
(24) JforK = for : e → (e → t) → (e → t).
Given that it was with raised usage in mind that we assigned to whom its meaning
in (22b), it may come as a surprise that the same meaning works equally well for
in-situ usage. But it does all work out: The derivation, which culminates in the
top-level type e{ e{ t, is shown in Figure 15. (If we assume furthermore that
remember can take semantic type (e{ e{ t)→ e→ t, then it is straightforward to
produce the narrow-scope reading (3b) of the example (1b) from Section 1.)
To see how this derivation works, it is useful to examine (22), where what
and who were assigned the (polymorphic) type (e ⇀ γ) → (e{ γ). In Section 3.2,
this type was justified because what needed to convert (→) an e-taking continuation
(⇀) to an e-wondering question ({). However, the same type can also be written as
e
[e{γ
γ
]
. A value of this type takes as input an e-taking continuation whose answer is
γ, but returns a final answer of type e{γ instead. Informally speaking, interrogative
NPs act like es locally, but in addition prepends “e{” to the current answer type.
Hence, as one might expect, the double-wh constructions in (23) receive the
semantic type e{ e{ t. The first “e{” in the type is contributed by the raised
wh-phrase what, or rather, contributed as “e ⇀” by the extraction gap and subse-
quently converted to “e{” by what. The second “e{” in the type is contributed
directly by the in-situ wh-phrase whom. Figure 16 illustrates this process.
e{ e{ t
w
ha
t
←−−
...
Convert “e ⇀” to “e{”
e ⇀ e{ t
w
e
bo
u
gh
t
←−− e ⇀ e{ t ←−−
...
Prepend “e ⇀”
e{ t
fo
r
←−− e{ t
w
ho
m
←−−
...
Prepend “e{”
t
Figure 16. Building the semantic type e{ e{ t for what we bought for whom,
with the narrow-scope reading for whom. Whereas the in-situ elements and whom
manipulate the answer type, the raised element what manipulates the value type.
It may be initially perplexing that the types in Figure 16 are manipulated
right-to-left. This pattern is explained if we postulate that evaluation in natural
language tends to proceed left-to-right. That is, when a function occurs linearly
before its argument, the function-then-argument version of lifted function appli-
cation is preferred, and vice versa. Left-to-right evaluation results in right-to-left
answer type manipulation, because constituents to the left decide what the answer
type looks like at outer levels. For example, J K wants the answer type to be a con-
tinuation at the outermost level it gets to affect. When building the answer type
bottom-up from t to e{ e{ t, the outermost decisions are executed last, not first.
Critical to the ability of the type (e ⇀ γ) → (e { γ) to serve two roles
at once is the lowering rule. In-situ wh-phrases (and gaps) combine with other
constituents and manipulate the answer type through lifted function application.
By contrast, raised wh-phrases combine with other constituents through ordinary
(unlifted) function application, and perform the conversion from “e ⇀” to “e{”
not on the answer type but on the value type. Before a raised wh-phrase can act on
a gapped clause, then, the clause needs a meaning whose value type—not answer
type—is of the form e⇀ · · · . The lowering rule fills this need: It extracts an answer
out of a lifted value by feeding it the identity continuation.
3.4. Higher-Order Continuations
We have seen above that, in my analysis of interrogatives, a single denotation for
each wh-phrase suffices for both raised and in-situ appearances, as long as the
wh-phrase takes narrow scope. To fulfill the promises I made in Section 1, I have
to turn to wide scope and account for two additional facts about interrogatives:
First, I have to show in my system that in-situ wh-phrases can take semantic scope
wider than the immediately enclosing clause, as they do in my initial examples (2a)
and (3a). Second, I have to show that raised wh-phrases cannot take wide scope; in
other words, they must take semantic scope exactly where they are overtly located.
I claim that higher-order continuations account for wide scope interroga-
tives.9 Our analyses in previous sections are lifted only to the first order. In PTQ
terms, this means that our values are sets of sets; more generally, our types are of
the form α[γ′γ
]
. Wide scope calls for lifting to the second order. In PTQ terms, this
means that our values need to be sets of sets of sets of sets; more generally, we
need to deal with types of the form α[γ′γ
][
δ′
δ
]
. Recall that values lifted to the first
order are manipulated using four additional semantic rules: lifting, lowering, and
lifted function application (two versions). I explain below how to introduce further
semantic rules into the grammar that manipulate values lifted to higher orders.
As described in Section 2.1, lifted function application is obtained by “lift-
ing” ordinary function application. Since ordinary function application is a binary
rule, it can be lifted in two ways (evaluation orders), giving two rules for lifted
function application. In general, any n-ary semantic rule, schematically
(25)
y : β
x1 : α1 x2 : α2 · · · xn : αn ,
can be lifted in n! ways, giving rise to n! lifted rules: For each permutation σ of the
numbers 1, 2, . . . , n, we can lift (25) to a new rule
(26)
λc. x¯σ−11
(
λxσ−11
. x¯σ−12
(
λxσ−12
. · · · x¯σ−1n
(
λxσ−1n . c(y)
)
· · ·
))
: β
[γ0
γn
]
x¯1 : α1
[γσ1−1
γσ1
]
x¯2 : α2
[γσ2−1
γσ2
]
· · · x¯n : αn
[γσn−1
γσn
]
.
For example, ordinary function application (Figure 1) can be lifted with σ1 = 1,
σ2 = 2 (Figure 10) or with σ1 = 2, σ2 = 1 (Figure 11).
Let G be a Montague grammar, each of whose semantic rules are of the form
in (25). We can lift G to a new grammar G′, with the following semantic rules:
• the value lifting rule (Figure 9);
• the value lowering rule (Figure 12); and
• every rule in G, along with the n! ways to lift it, where n is the arity.
Let G0 be “pure” Montague grammar, where the only semantic rule is function
application. Lifting G0 gives a new grammar G′0; call it G1. Lifting G1 gives another
grammar G′1 = G′′0 ; call it G2. These grammars and their rules are illustrated in
Figure 1. The grammar G2 contains the semantic rules we need to manipulate values
lifted to the second order: lifted lifting, lifted lowering, and twice-lifted function
application (four versions). The process may continue indefinitely.
In a once-lifted grammar, many types are of the form α[γ′γ
]
. As explained
in Section 3.1, such a type can be understood to mean “acts locally like an α while
changing the answer type from γ to γ′”. In a twice-lifted grammar, many types are
of the form α[γ′γ
][
δ′
δ
]
. One way to understand such types is to think of a derivation
in a twice-lifted grammar as maintaining two answer types—an inner answer type
corresponding to the first time the grammar is lifted, and an outer one corresponding
to the second time. A type of the form α[γ′γ
][
δ′
δ
]
means “acts locally like an α while
changing the inner answer type from γ to γ′ and the outer answer type from δ to δ′”.
To strengthen this understanding, let us examine how answer types are ma-
nipulated in the four binary composition rules that result from lifting function ap-
plication twice. In Figure 17, I expand out the rules, in particular the types. In the
rules >> and ><, evaluation proceeds from function to argument at the first contin-
Table 1. Lifting Montague grammar. Starting from function application (G0), lift-
ing once gives a grammar (G1) with 2 unary rules and 3 binary rules. Lifting again
gives a grammar (G2) with 4 unary rules and 7 binary rules. In the table, “ f > x”
means “evaluating function first”; “x > f ” means “evaluating argument first”.
Unary rule G0 G1 G2
Value lifting • = •
Value lifting, lifted •
Value lowering • = •
Value lowering, lifted •
Binary rule G0 G1 G2
Function application, lifted f > x, lifted f > x •
Function application, lifted f > x • = •
Function application, lifted f > x, lifted x > f •
Function application • = • = •
Function application, lifted x > f , lifted f > x •
Function application, lifted x > f • = •
Function application, lifted x > f , lifted x > f •
λd. ¯¯f (λ ¯f . ¯x¯(λx¯. d(λc. ¯f (λ f . x¯(λx. c( f (x))))))) : β[γ0γ2
][δ0
δ2
]
>>
¯
¯f : (α→ β)[γ0γ1
][δ0
δ1
]
¯x¯ : α
[γ1
γ2
][δ1
δ2
]
λd. ¯x¯(λx¯. ¯¯f (λ ¯f . d(λc. ¯f (λ f . x¯(λx. c( f (x))))))) : β[γ0γ2
][δ0
δ2
]
><
¯
¯f : (α→ β)[γ0γ1
][δ1
δ2
]
¯x¯ : α
[γ1
γ2
][δ0
δ1
]
λd. ¯¯f (λ ¯f . ¯x¯(λx¯. d(λc. x¯(λx. ¯f (λ f . c( f (x))))))) : β[γ0γ2
][δ0
δ2
]
<>
¯
¯f : (α→ β)[γ1γ2
][δ0
δ1
]
¯x¯ : α
[γ0
γ1
][δ1
δ2
]
λd. ¯x¯(λx¯. ¯¯f (λ ¯f . d(λc. x¯(λx. ¯f (λ f . c( f (x))))))) : β[γ0γ2
][δ0
δ2
]
<<
¯
¯f : (α→ β)[γ1γ2
][δ1
δ2
]
¯x¯ : α
[γ0
γ1
][δ0
δ1
]
Figure 17. Twice-lifted function application (four versions)
uation level. Accordingly, the subscripts on γ show that the inner answer type is
threaded first through the argument ¯x¯ and then through the function ¯¯f . In the rules
<> and << the reverse happens: Evaluation proceeds from argument to function,
and the inner answer type is threaded through first ¯¯f and then ¯x¯.
Similarly for the second continuation level: In the rules >> and <>, eval-
uation proceeds from function to argument, and the subscripts on δ show that the
outer answer type is threaded first through ¯x¯ and then through ¯¯f . In the rules ><
and <<, evaluation proceeds from argument to function, and the outer answer type
is threaded through first ¯¯f and then ¯x¯.
λd. λy. [animate(y)] d(λx. [¬animate(x)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we)) : (e{ t)[e{δδ
]
>
((e ⇀ t) → (e{ t))[e{δe{δ
]
∧
JwhatK : (e ⇀ t)
→ (e{ t)
λd. λy. [animate(y)] d(λx.
for(y)(buy(x))(we)) : (e ⇀ t)[e{δδ
]
∨∗
λd. λy. [animate(y)] d(λc. λx.
c(for(y)(buy(x))(we))) : t[e⇀tt
][
e{δ
δ
]
>>
e
[
e⇀t
e⇀t
][
e{δ
e{δ
]
∧
e
[
e⇀t
e⇀t
]
∧
we : e
λd. λy. [animate(y)] d(λc. λx.
c(for(y)(buy(x)))) : (e → t)[e⇀tt
][
e{δ
δ
]
>>
λd. d(λc. λx. c(buy(x)))
: (e → t)[e⇀tt
][
e{δ
e{δ
]
>>
(e → e → t)[
e⇀t
e⇀t
][
e{δ
e{δ
]
∧
(e → e → t)[e⇀te⇀t
]
∧
buy : e → e → t
e
[
e⇀t
t
][
e{δ
e{δ
]
∧
λc. c : e
[
e⇀t
t
]
((e → t)→ (e → t))[tt
][
e{δ
δ
]
>>
(
e → (e → t)
→(e → t))[tt
][
e{δ
e{δ
]
∧(
e → (e → t)
→(e → t))[tt
]
∧
for : e → (e → t)→ (e → t)
e
[t
t
][
e{δ
δ
]
∧∗
JwhoK
: e
[
e{δ
δ
]
Figure 18. What we bought for whom, with the wide-scope reading for whom
3.5. Wide Scope and Baker’s Ambiguity
With second-order continuations, we can compute the wide-scope reading (3a) for
the sentence (1b) from Section 1, repeated here with gaps represented explicitly.
(1b′) Who do you think remembers [what we bought for whom]?
I extend the grammar only by lifting it again as discussed above, and add no new
denotations to the lexicon other than the obvious missing entries
(27) you : e, think : t → e → t.
The wide-scope reading of the example (1b) is a double-wh question. Thus,
we expect the matrix clause to have the semantic type e{ e{ t. What about the
embedded clause? It acts locally like a single-wh question (what), but in addition
should prepend “e{” to the answer type (whom). We thus expect the embedded
clause to have the type (e{ t)[e{δδ
]
, a special case of which is (e{ t)[e{tt
]
.
Figure 18 shows a derivation for what we bought for whom that culminates
in precisely the expected type. The interesting part of the derivation is how the three
continuation-manipulating elements what, , and whom enter it. The narrow-scope
elements what and need to manipulate the inner answer type while remaining
oblivious to the second continuation level, so we lift them. The wide-scope element
whom, on the other hand, needs to manipulate the outer answer type while leaving
the first continuation level alone; to achieve this effect, we lift it “from the inside”
using the lifted lifting rule (depicted as ∧∗). Near the top of the derivation, we use
the lifted lowering rule (depicted as ∨∗) to lower the embedded clause’s denotation
“from the inside”, that is, on the first rather than second continuation level.
Given a meaning for what we bought for whom of the expected type above,
the semantics of the matrix question follows easily from the techniques already
demonstrated in previous sections. Second-order continuations are no longer in-
volved. The embedded clause is just a constituent that contains an in-situ wh-phrase
whom; like any other such constituent, it combines with the rest of the sentence, in-
cluding the raised wh-phrase who, to give a final denotation of type e{ e { t,
typical of a double-wh interrogative. Figure 19 shows the derivation.
We have seen that higher-order continuations allow in-situ wh-phrases to
take wide scope. I now explain why raised wh-phrases cannot take wide scope,
no matter how many times we lift the grammar. What does it mean for a raised
wh-phrase to take wide scope? Based on the analyses so far, I make the following
definitional characterization: A raised wh-phrase takes narrow scope when it con-
tributes its “e{” to the clause’s value type, and wide scope when it contributes its
“e{” to the clause’s outgoing answer type (or rather, one of the clause’s outgo-
ing answer types, in the presence of higher-order continuations). More precisely,
consider a clause with a raised wh-phrase in front and a corresponding gap inside.
(28) [a [b wh] [c . . . [d t] . . . ]]
For the wh-phrase b to take narrow scope is for the clause a to have semantic type
of the form (e{ α)[γ′1γ1
]
· · ·
[
γ′n
γn
]
, and the clause-sans-wh-phrase c the corresponding
form
(
e⇀α
)[γ′1
γ1
]
· · ·
[
γ′n
γn
]
, such that the “e{” was contributed as “e⇀” by the gap d
and subsequently converted to “e{” by the wh-phrase b. This is demonstrated in
Section 3.2.
By contrast, for the wh-phrase b to take wide scope is for a to have semantic
type of the form β
[e{α
α
][γ′1
γ1
]
· · ·
[
γ′n
γn
]
, and c the corresponding form β[e⇀αα
][γ′1
γ1
]
· · ·
[
γ′n
γn
]
,
such that the “e{” was contributed as “e ⇀” by d and subsequently converted to
“e{” by b. This is impossible because it requires replacing “e ⇀” with “e{”
in an answer type, a feat performed by neither any element in the lexicon nor any
rule in the grammar: A survey of the lexical items and grammar rules in this paper
reveals that the they and their descendants-by-lifting only manipulate answer types
by adding to them. Nothing ever takes apart any answer type until the answer has
been lowered to value level. The formalism I use here does not stipulate this—
in fact, one can easily introduce into the lexicon raised wh-phrases that take wide
scope, but English does not appear to contain these denotations:
JwhatK , λp. λc. λx. [¬animate(x)] p(c)(x) : α[e⇀γγ ]→ α[e{γγ ],(29a)
JwhoK , λp. λc. λx. [animate(x)] p(c)(x) : α[e⇀γγ ]→ α[e{γγ ].(29b)
λz. [animate(z)] λy. [animate(y)]
think
(
remember
(
λx. [¬animate(x)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we))(z))(you) : e{ e{ t
JwhoK
: (e ⇀ e{ t)
→ (e{ e{ t)
λz. λy. [animate(y)]
think
(
remember
(
λx. [¬animate(x)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we))(z))(you) : e ⇀ e{ t
∨
λd. λz. λy. [animate(y)]
d(think(remember(λx. [¬animate(x)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we))(z))(you)) : t[e⇀e{tt
]
>
e
[
e⇀e{t
e⇀e{t
]
∧
you : e
λd. λz. λy. [animate(y)]
d(think(remember(λx. [¬animate(x)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we))(z))) : (e → t)[e⇀e{tt
]
>
(t → e ⇀ t)[e⇀e{te⇀e{t
]
∧
think : t → e ⇀ t
λd. λz. λy. [animate(y)]
d(remember(λx. [¬animate(x)]
for(y)(buy(x))(we))(z)) : t[e⇀e{tt
]
>
λc. c : e
[
e⇀e{t
e{t
] (e → t)[e{tt
]
>
((e{ t) → e → t)[e{te{t
]
∧
remember : (e{ t) → e → t
(e{ t)[e{tt
]
what we bought for whom
(Figure 18)
Figure 19. Who you thinks remembers what we bought for whom, with the wide-
scope reading for whom
4. Discussion
This paper presents a grammar fragment that captures two properties of English
interrogatives: First, wh-phrases can appear both raised and in-situ. Second, in-
situ wh-phrases can take scope beyond the immediately enclosing clause, but raised
wh-phrases must take scope exactly where they are pronounced. My fragment is
inspired by Barker’s continuation semantics for natural language (2000a; 2000b)
and work on continuations and typed contexts in programming languages (Danvy
and Filinski, 1989, 1990; Murthy, 1992; Wadler, 1994).
As a semantics of interrogatives, this paper leaves many concerns unad-
dressed: languages other than English; pair-list questions; relative clauses; interac-
tions with intensionality and quantification; and so on. Regardless, the two prop-
erties of interrogatives that I do explore fall out surprisingly naturally: The same
wh-denotation works both raised and in-situ, but in raised position it is forced to take
overt scope by a theorem of the type system. The basic ideas probably carry over
to other kinds of so-called ¯A-movement, such as topicalization. Continuations also
suggest new ways to understand phenomena such as superiority and pied-piping,
but for lack of space I leave these investigations for elsewhere.
Endnotes
∗Thanks to Stuart Shieber, Chris Barker, Danny Fox, Pauline Jacobson, Norman
Ramsey, Dylan Thurston, MIT 24.979 Spring 2001 (Kai von Fintel and Irene Heim),
the Harvard AI Research Group, the Center for the Study of Language and Infor-
mation at Stanford University, and the referees at SALT 12. This work is supported
by National Science Foundation Grant IRI-9712068.
1I disregard here the distinction between questions that allow or expect pair-list
answers (Alice remembers where we bought the vase, and Bob remembers where
we bought the table) and questions that require or expect non-pair-list answers.
2To be clear, a raised wh-phrase can often take scope beyond the clause immediately
enclosing its corresponding gap. The generalization I state here is that a raised
wh-phrase cannot take scope beyond the clause in front of which it is pronounced.
3Throughout this paper, I use the Greek letters α, β, γ, and δ to represent type vari-
ables, in other words variables that can be instantiated with any type. Thus what
this paper calls types are known as type-schemes in the Hindley-Milner type sys-
tem (Hindley and Seldin, 1986). Also, by convention, all binary type constructors
associate to the right: The type e → e → t, unparenthesized, means e → (e → t).
4The concept of answer types in continuation semantics is separate from the concept
of appropriate answerhood in interrogatives.
5So do Hendriks’s (1993) and Barker’s (2000a) later proposals. For simplicity and
because they are irrelevant, I omit restrictions on quantification (“animate(x)⇒· · · ”)
in (10) and below.
6That I posit a phonologically null element is a matter of presentation and not criti-
cal to the approach to extraction sketched here. It would work equally well for my
purposes to introduce type-shift operations that effectively roll J K into binary rules.
7The idea that a variable or gap is in some sense an identity function over continu-
ations appeared in the work of Danvy and Filinski (1989, §3.4), and also has been
mentioned to me by Barker. The more general idea that a variable or gap is an iden-
tity function of some sort has an even longer history in computer science (Hindley
and Seldin, 1986) and linguistics (Jacobson, 1999).
8This pseudo-operational description is merely an intuitive sketch. The denotations
in my semantics are computed purely in-situ according to local composition rules.
9In the same spirit, Barker (2000b) used higher-order continuations to treat wide-
scope specific indefinites and interactions between coordination and antecedent-
contained deletion.
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